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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
         The Secretary of Labor's petition for review of the 
decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
("Commission") presents the question of whether respondent D.M. 
Sabia Company ("Sabia") committed a "repeated" violation of a 
safety standard within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.  666(a).  
Applying the definition of "repeated" announced in Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976), the Commission 
concluded that Sabia had not committed a "repeated" violation.   
         The Secretary contends that we are neither bound by 
Bethlehem nor bound by that court's 1976 definition of the term 
"repeated" as that term then appeared in the text of 29 U.S.C. 
 666(a). 
         Sabia, on the other hand, argues that Bethlehemcontrols the 
decision in this case and cannot be overruled by us 
as a subsequent panel of this court. 
         In Bethlehem, we held that the Secretary, in order to 
establish a "repeated" violation, under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 ("Act"), 29 U.S.C.  651 et seq., must 
prove that the employer had violated an Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) standard on at least two previous 
occasions; and that the employer had "flaunted" the requirements 
of the Act.  Id. at 162.  In 1990, however, 29 U.S.C.  666(a) 
was amended.  In light of that amendment, the rationale and logic 
of Bethlehem, while binding until the 1990 amendment, thereafter 
did not retain the requisite precedential authority that would 
preclude us from taking a fresh look at the now-amended section 
666(a). 
         Our fresh look has resulted in a new definition:  we 
now deem an OSHA violation to be "repeated" "if, at the time of 
the alleged repeated violation, there was a Commission final 
order against the same employer for a substantially similar 
violation."  Secretary of Labor v. Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. 
(BNA) 1061, 1063 (Rev. Comm'n 1979).  Applying this 
interpretation, we conclude that Sabia committed a "repeated" 
violation.  Accordingly, we will reverse. 
 
                                I. 
         The Commission had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
 659(c).  We have appellate jurisdiction over the Commission's 
final order under 29 U.S.C.  660. 
         The Commission's findings of fact must be upheld if 
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.  29 
U.S.C.  660(a); D. Harris Masonry Contracting, Inc. v. Dole, 876 
F.2d 343, 344 (3d Cir. 1989).  Legal conclusions may be set aside 
if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law."  5 U.S.C.  706(2)(A); 
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 
1976).  In addition, we must defer to an agency's reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous administrative statute.  Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843-46 (1984) 
 
                               II. 
         Sabia, a Pennsylvania corporation, is a masonry 
contractor which employs approximately 152 employees.  On October 
26, 1993, Mark Stelmack, an OSHA compliance officer, observed 
Sabia employees setting block from two "non-stop" scaffold towers 
located along the north wall of a construction site at 315 North 
York Road, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.  The scaffold platforms 
were sixteen to twenty feet above the ground.  No guardrails or 
toeboards were provided on the ends of the scaffold towers or on 
the inside of the eastern tower where it extended beyond the end 
of the wall.  Hence, Sabia employees working on the scaffold 
towers were exposed to the danger of falling off the scaffolds, 
which could result in serious injuries or death. 
         On November 26, 1993, based on Stelmack's inspection, 
OSHA issued two citations, only one of which is relevant to this 
appeal.  The relevant citation alleged a "repeat" violation of 
29 C.F.R.  1926.451(a)(4) for failure to install standard 
guardrails and toeboards on all open sides and ends of platforms 
above the ground.  Sabia had been cited on three previous 
occasions for the same or similar violations, each of which 
resulted in a final order:  July 22, 1974; January 23, 1985; and 
May 16, 1991.  Jt. App. 20 (Stipulation of Facts). 
         Relying on a stipulated record and on Potlatch, the 
ALJ held that Sabia had "repeatedly" violated section 
1926.451(a)(4) "because 'at the time of the alleged repeated 
violation, there was a Commission final order against the same 
employer for a substantially similar violation . . . .'"  Jt. 
App. 14 (quoting Potlatch, 7 O.S.H. Cas. at 1063).  Accordingly, 
the ALJ assessed a $4,000 fine. 
         The ALJ acknowledged that the Commission's definition 
of "repeated," as articulated in Potlatch, differed from the 
Third Circuit's definition, as enunciated in Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976).  The ALJ 
nevertheless applied the Potlatch definition rather than 
Bethlehem's definition, based upon the ALJ's reading of Jersey 
Steel Erectors v. Secretary of Labor, 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1162 
(Rev. Comm'n 1993), aff'd, 19 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 1994).   
         The ALJ interpreted the Commission's decision in Jersey 
Steel as requiring application of the Potlatch definition even in 
cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit.  The 
Commission, however, rejected the ALJ's interpretation of Jersey 
Steel.  The Commission explained that in Jersey Steel, it had 
found that the employer's violations would be considered "re- 
 
peated" under either definition.  In so holding, the Commission 
recognized that Bethlehem's definition differed from the 
Secretary's definition, as articulated in Potlatch.  Hence, in a 
decision dated October 30, 1995, the Commission reversed the 
ALJ's order.   
         The Commission first noted its disagreement with  our 
analysis in Bethlehem, but then indicated that it felt compelled 
to apply the Bethlehem definition of "repeatedly" in cases 
arising within the Third Circuit.  Applying the Bethlehem test, 
the Commission concluded that the Secretary had failed to prove 
that Sabia's violation was "repeated."  Specifically, the 
Commission found that while Sabia's four violations of the same 
regulation over a period of years met the first prong of the 
Bethlehem test (i.e., that the employer had committed more than 
two violations), the Secretary had not established the second 
prong of Bethlehem (i.e., that the employer had "flaunted" the 
Act).  Finding that the challenged violation was "serious," the 
Commission assessed a $1,000 penalty. 
         The Secretary of Labor filed a timely petition for 
review of the final order of the Commission. 
 
                               III. 
         The central, and indeed the only, issue on this appeal 
is whether Sabia's violation of 29 C.F.R.  1926.451(d) 
constituted a "repeated" violation within the meaning of 29 
U.S.C.  666(a).  Applying the Potlatch standard, the Secretary 
contends that "[a] violation is repeated under section 17(a) of 
the Act if, at the time of the alleged repeated violation, there 
was a Commission final order against the same employer for a 
substantially similar violation."  7 O.S.H. Cas. at 1063.   
         As stipulated by the parties, Sabia had been cited for 
the same or similar violation of section 1926.451(a)(4) on three 
previous occasions, and "each citation went to a final order."  
Jt. App. 20.  Hence, the stipulated facts, under the Secretary's 
theory, establish a "repeated" violation under the Potlatchstandard. 
         As noted earlier in this opinion, the Commission had 
held that the Potlatch standard could not be applied in this 
circuit as it conflicted with the standard articulated in 
Bethlehem.  In Bethlehem, which was the first court of appeals 
decision to construe the term "repeatedly" as it appeared in the 
unamended 29 U.S.C.  666(a), we held that a violation is 
"repeated" if (1) the employer had violated the same standard on 
at least two previous occasions; and (2) the employer "flaunted" 
the requirements of the Act.  Bethlehem 540 F.2d at 162.  In 
determining whether an employer had "flaunted" the requirements 
of the Act, the Bethlehem court considered the following factors: 
         the number, proximity in time, nature and 
         extent of violations, their factual and legal 
         relatedness, the degree of care of the em- 
          
         ployer in his efforts to prevent violations 
         of the type involved, and the nature of the 
         duties, standards, or regulations violated. 
 
Id. at 162.  The Commission found that the stipulated facts in 
the present case were insufficient to establish that Sabia had 
"flaunted" the requirements of the Act. 
         The Secretary asserts, however, that Bethlehem has been 
superseded, in light of the 1990 amendment to 29 U.S.C. 
 666(a).  Sabia, on the other hand, argues that Bethlehemcontinues to be 
"good law" and will continue to be binding 
precedent until overruled by this court en banc. 
         We agree with the Secretary that Bethlehem does not 
control the disposition of this case.  Although a panel of this 
court is bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a published 
decision of a prior panel, see supra note 2, a panel may reevalu- 
 
ate a precedent in light of intervening authority and amendments 
to statutes or regulations.  See United States v. Joshua, 976 
F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a panel is "free to 
consider the [Sentencing] Commission's [newly adopted 
interpretive] commentary and, based thereon, reach a decision 
contrary to the holdings of [prior precedent]"); United States v. 
Bass, 54 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that "Joshua, 
under certain circumstances, permits courts in this circuit to 
consider subsequent amendments to official guidelines commentary 
when interpreting prior guidelines, even if the new commentary 
conflicts with a panel's decision rendered prior to the amend- 
 
ment"). 
         Our sister circuits abide by that self-same principle.  
See, e.g., Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st 
Cir.) ("An existing panel decision may be undermined by 
controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion 
of the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or 
a statutory overruling."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995); 
Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of 
Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding 
that "if a panel finds that a NLRB interpretation of the labor 
laws is reasonable and consistent with those laws, the panel may 
adopt that interpretation even if circuit precedent is to the 
contrary"); Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643, 648 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that a three-judge panel may reexamine circuit 
precedent "where Congress has retroactively clarified the meaning 
of the statute at issue").  Cf. also Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (precedent may be overruled when 
intervening development of law has "weakened" conceptual 
underpinnings of prior decision).   
         In the present case, two intervening developments 
radically altered the legal landscape which gave rise to the 
Bethlehem court's interpretation of section 666(a). 
 
                                A. 
         The first development that took place was the 1990 
amendment to section 666(a), which for the first time 
distinguished between the civil penalties for a "willful" 
violation and those for a "repeated" violation.  See Pub. L. 101- 
508,  3101, 104 Stat. 1388-29 (Nov. 5, 1990).  In 1976, when 
Bethlehem was decided, section 666(a) imposed no floor as to 
penalties and imposed the same $10,000 penalty ceiling for 
"repeated" violations as for willful violations: 
         Any employer who willfully or repeatedly 
         violates the requirements of section 654 of 
         this title . . . may be assessed a civil 
         penalty of not more than $10,000 for each 
         violation. 
 
29 U.S.C.  666(a) (1976). 
         According to the Bethlehem court, the fact that the 
civil penalty limitations were the same for "repeated" and 
"willful" violations demonstrated that Congress intended that the 
term "repeated" be equated with the term "willful."  The 
Bethlehem court, in defining the term "repeated," focused almost 
wholly on the penalty structure set forth in the then-section 
666(a), which, as noted, did not distinguish between the two 
types of violations.  To dispel any thought that the term 
"repeated" had a different meaning than the term "willful," the 
Bethlehem court reasoned that the violative conduct must be 
sufficiently flagrant to rise to the level of "willful" conduct.  
In concluding that "the . . . conduct which [the term] 
'repeatedly' encompasses must be similar to that which would 
raise an inference of willfulness," Bethlehem, 540 F.2d at 162, 
the court relied conclusively on the fact that section 666(a) 
authorized identical civil penalties for "repeated" and "willful" 
violations. 
         It was only with the 1990 amendment to section 666(a) 
that the statutory landscape changed.  That amendment, by 
requiring a $5,000 minimum penalty for willful violations but not 
for repeated violations, negated the central premise underlying 
the Bethlehem decision.  Regardless of the validity of Bethle- 
 
hem's reasoning with respect to the pre-1990 section 666(a), that 
statute, as amended, clearly shows that Congress, at least by and 
after 1990, intended a substantive distinction between a willfulviolation 
and a violation that is repeated but not willful.  
Hence, under the amended statute, Bethlehem's interpretation of 
section 666(a), which equates "repeated" with "willful," is no 
longer justified. 
 
                                B. 
         Secondly, subsequent Supreme Court precedent has also 
undercut Bethlehem.  Specifically, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
decided some eight years after Bethlehem, established that a 
federal court must defer to a reasonable construction of a 
statute by the administrative agency charged with administering 
the statute if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.  Id. at 843, 846 ("[A] court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. 
. . .  If the agency's choice represents a reasonable 
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency's care by the statute, [a court] should not disturb it 
unless it appears from the statute . . . that the accommodation 
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."); see also, 
e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 
170, 182 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 816 (1996). 
         Recently, the Supreme Court reemphasized that courts 
must defer to an agency's interpretation of statutes that the 
agency is charged with administering, explaining why such a high 
degree of deference is owed: 
         It is our practice to defer to the reasonable 
         judgments of agencies with regard to the 
         meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes they 
         are charged with administering. . . .  We 
         accord deference to agencies . . . not be- 
          
         cause of a presumption they drafted the pro- 
          
         visions in question, or were present at the 
         hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; 
         but rather because of a presumption that 
         Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute 
         meant for implementation by an agency, under- 
          
         stood that the ambiguity would be resolved, 
         first and foremost, by the agency, and de- 
          
         sired the agency (rather than the courts) to 
         possess whatever degree of discretion the 
         ambiguity allows. . . .  [T]he whole point of 
         Chevron is to leave the discretion provided 
         by the ambiguities of a statute with the 
         implementing agency. 
 
Smiley v. CitiBank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733-34 
(1996). 
         At the time that Bethlehem was decided, the court did 
not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in 
Chevron and Smiley.  Moreover, at the time, it was unclear 
whether deference was owed to the Secretary or the Commission 
when the two administrative actors disagreed.  See Budd Co. v. 
OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201, 205 n.12 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[W]e need not 
address the question whether the court should afford greater 
respect to the Commission's interpretation or the Secretary's 
when the two are unable to agree as to the proper construction of 
a safety standard."); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 
573 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Bethlehem II") ("Unlike Budd, 
we do not have an authoritative agency interpretation to assist 
us since the decisions of the Commission are themselves in 
conflict and inconsistent with the Secretary's position.  We 
rely, therefore, on the plain wording of the standard . . . ."). 
         Hence, the Bethlehem court had not deferred to the 
Secretary's construction of section 666(a), opting instead to 
exercise plenary review.  See Bethlehem, 540 F.2d at 160 ("This 
is a question of law, and our review is necessarily broad.").  
Since then, of course, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
the Secretary is the administrative actor to whom deference is 
owed.  See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991) ("The power 
to render authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations is 
a 'necessary adjunct' of the Secretary's powers to promulgate and 
to enforce national health and safety standards.").  Under 
Martin, a federal court should defer to the Secretary where there 
is a disagreement between the Secretary and the Commission.  By 
employing a plenary standard of review and failing to defer to 
the Secretary's interpretation of section 666(a), Bethlehemoffended the 
Martin standard. 
         Finally, it is evident that the Secretary's 
interpretation of the term "repeatedly" in the post-1990 section 
666(a) represents not only a reasonable interpretation but one 
that is plainly consistent with the language of the statute.  
Enhanced liability for a second or subsequent violation of the 
same or similar regulation or standard is appropriate because 
once an employer has been found to have violated the Act, it is 
reasonable to expect that extra precautions will be taken to 
prevent a "repeated" violation. 
 
                               IV. 
         Although Sabia insists that we are bound by Bethlehem, 
our analysis, which is informed by a different statute and a new 
standard of review, dictates otherwise.  In our opinion, the 
Bethlehem court correctly decided the issue before it.  It did so 
in light of the statutory text which it was called upon to 
interpret and in light of the standard by which it reviewed the 
statute before it.  Since then, as we have earlier observed, the 
statute and the standard of review have changed so that Bethlehemno longer 
controls our disposition. 
         We therefore conclude that a violation is "repeated" 
"if, at the time of the alleged repeated violation, there was a 
Commission final order against the same employer for a substan- 
 
tially similar violation."  Potlatch, 7 O.S.H. Cas. at 1063.  
Accordingly, the formula prescribed in Bethlehem for determining 
when a repeated violation occurs is no longer operative.  A 
repeated violation requires no more than a second violation and 
does not require proof of "flaunting."  Since Sabia stipulated 
that it had been cited for "the same or similar violation" of 
section 1926.451(a)(4) on May 16, 1991, a little more than two 
years before the present violation, and that the citation had 
resulted in a final order of the Commission, we necessarily 
conclude that Sabia's violation was "repeated" within the meaning 
of section 666(a). 
         We therefore grant the Secretary's petition for review.  
We will vacate the order of the Commission, and we will remand to 
the Commission with the direction that the Commission reinstate 
the November 25, 1994 order of the ALJ affirming the citation and 
imposing a penalty of $4,000 as stipulated by the parties.  Jt. 
App. 15. 
